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RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE SELECTIVE SERVICE
SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION

The Selective Service System has come under increasing criticism
by both and-war demonstrators outside the Government and legislators
within it. Anticipation of a revision of the system arose within Congress
in the spring of 1967 when the law's four-year provision was due to
expire. In preparation for that event, proposals were forwarded which
called for a "volunteer army," a "lottery system," or for drastic revisions within the law's basic framework.- The expectations for a
sweeping change came to an end when Congress re-enacted the basic
system for another four years.2
During the congressional considerations of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, Senator Morse proposed an amendment that would
have provided the right to counsel for registrants appearing before
local draft boards when appealing their classifications.3 The Selective
Service Regulations at that time specifically prohibited an attorney's
presence. In spite of the proposed amendment and a similar one advanced by Senator Long of Missouri to the Omnibus Crime Control
Bill of 1968,1 an attorney's presence remains prohibited.
The purpose of this discussion is to explore further the issue presented by the above-mentioned amendments. Although the present
Selective Service System will be enforced until July, 1971, it is subject
to procedural changes through amendment of the Selective Service
Regulations.5 Further, although the circuit courts of appeal have failed
to recognize this extension of the right to counsel, the Supreme Court
has yet to decide the issue.6
The registrant's right to the presence of counsel in his personal appearance before the local draft board will be viewed from two standpoints. First, the Supreme Court increasingly has broadened the sixth
1. See 113 CoNG. REc. 6723-27, 6734-80 (daily ed. May 11, 1967), debates on Military
Selective Service Act of 1967; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON SELECTIVE SERVICE,
IN PURSUIT OF EQuITy: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE?

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50
113 CONG. REc. 6778-9 (daily ed. May 11,
114 CoNG. REC. 6073-89 (daily ed. May 22,
32 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1968).
United States v. Capson, 347 F.2d 959 (10th
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(1967).

U.S.CA. §§ 451-73 (App. 1968).
1967).
1968).
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965).
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amendment right to counsel in criminal cases. That this right should be
extended to the Selective Service System follows from a recognition
of the view that a registrant's appearance before his local board may
be a critical stage in a later criminal proceeding. Secondly, the registrant's right and need for an attorney must contend with the fear
that an attorney's presence may greatly inhibit the board's ability to
function in a time of national emergency. By utilizing these two approaches it will become evident that a need does exist for an attorney
to represent the registrant. The denial of that need is unfounded in
fact and its fulfillment lies in an extension of the right to counsel doctrine.7
BACKGROUND

The Selective Training and Service Act of 19408 was the precursor
of today's draft system. It expired in 1947 but, due to the increasing
pressures of the Cold War, President Truman called for the first longrange peace-time draft in the nation's history. The Selective Service
Act of 19481 resulted.' In 1967, the name of the Act was changed to
the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. The import of this Act
was to continue the present system until July, 1971."
Under the present Selective Service procedure, after a local board
has classified a registrant, he is allowed to appeal to his local board if
he is dissatisfied with his classification. The registrant must give written notice of his desire to appeal within thirty days after receiving his
classification.' 2 At this appearance:
7. The right to counsel in an administrative agency will not be discussed except to
note that the Selective Service Agency has been taken completely out of the reach of
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. That Act provided:

Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or representative thereof shall be accorded the right to be accompanied, represented and
advised by counsel, or if permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative. Every party shall be accorded the right to appear in person or by
or with counsel or other duly qualified representative in any agency proceeding. ch. 324, § 6, 60 Stat. 240.
The Selective Service Agency was removed from the operation of the Act except as to
section 3 of such Act in 50 U.S.C.A. § 463 (b) (App. 1968).
8. Ch. 720 §§ 1-18, 54 Stat. 885 (1940).
9. Ch. 625, §§ 1-20, 62 Stat. 604, as amended 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 451-73 (App. 1968).

10. For a detailed examination of the history and procedure of the Selective Service
System see Note, The Selective Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160 (1966).

11. Some changes were enacted; however, none of them are of concern to the
present discussion.
12. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1 (a) (b)

(1968 rev.).

This information also is presented on the

back of every Notice of Classification, SSS Form No. 110, revised May 25, 1967.
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. . . [t] he registrant may discuss his classification, may point out
the class or classes in which he thinks he should have been placed,
and may direct attention to any information in his file which he
believes the local board has overlooked or to which he believes it
has not given sufficient weight. The registrant may present such
further information as he believes will assist the local board in determining his proper classification. Such information shall be in
writing, or, if oral, shall be summarized in writing by the registrant and, in either event, shall be placed in the registrant's file.
The information furnished should be as concise as possible under
the circumstances. The member or members of the local board
before whom the registrant appears may impose such limitations
upon the time which the registrant may have for his appearance
as they deem necessary. 13
At his personal appearance the registrant, in the discretion of the local
board, may have any other person appear with him or on his behalf;
however, "no registrant may be represented before the local board by
anyone acting as attorney or legal counsel." ' After the personal appearance, the local board is required to reconsider the registrant's
classification and may either reclassify him or determine not to reopen his classification. 15 The registrant is then notified of the board's
decision by the mailing of a Notice of Classification 16 to him.
After receiving his Notice of Classification following his personal
appearance, the unsatisfied registrant has thirty days to appeal a second
time to the State Appeal Board for his district.'1 There is no provision
in the regulations allowing a registrant a personal appearance before the
appeal board; however, he
may attach to [his] appeal a statement specifying the matters in
which he believes the local board erred, may direct attention to
any information in his file which he believes the local board has
failed to consider or to give sufficient weight, and may set out in
full any information which was offered to the local board and
which the local board failed or refused to include in [his] file. 18
13. Id. at § 1624.2(b).
14. Id. at § 1624.1(b).
15. Id. at § 1624.2 (c) (d).
16. Id. (Selective Service Form No. 110, revised May 25, 1967).
17. It should be noted that many other persons also have this right of appeal, including
the National and State Director of the Selective Service, the government appeal agent
and any person claiming to be a dependent of the registrant. Id. at §§ 1626.1-2(a) (b) (c).
18. Id. at § 1626.12.
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In this second appeal, the board is not allowed to receive or consider
any information other than what is contained in the record received
from the local board and general information concerning economic,
industrial, and social conditions. 9
Under two circumstances a further appeal from the state board may
be taken to the President's Appeal Board. Such an appeal is granted
if there was a dissenting vote when the State Appeal Board considered
the registrant's case, or if the State Director or the National Director
takes an appeal for him. ° As in the appeal to the State Appeal Board,
there is no provision for a personal appearance by the registrant or
anyone representing him.
Since a personal appearance is allowed the registrant only during
his first appeal to his local board, it is only at this point that the right
to counsel becomes necessary. Therefore, a brief overview of the local
boards will be helpful. The philosophy of their composition and function has been termed that of a "friends and neighbors" concept. They
are founded upon the grassroots principle by which boards made up
of citizens in each community determine when registrants should be
made available for military service. 21 "Such a philosophy . . . rejects a
firm, nationally directed system of rules and procedures, and ... places
great faith in local discretion and informality." 22 The persons exercising this discretion are volunteer civilians2 3 who perform this function
24
mainly out of a sense of civic duty.
Assigned to each local board is a government appeal agent who is to
be available to advise the registrant regarding his rights and liabilities
under the Selective Service Regulations.2 5 He also is uncompensated
for his services and whenever possible should be a person with legal
training and experience.2 6 His advisory duties flow to both the registrant and to the local board. Specifically, his duties are to appeal from
any classification of the local board brought to his attention which
19. id. at § 1626.24(b). It is presumed that this economic, industrial, and social information is what section 1626.12 is referring to when it allows additional information
to be attached to the registrant's appeal statement. Otherwise, any other information
contained in the appeal statement would not be considered under this regulation.
20.
21.
22.
23.

id. at §§ 1627.1-3 (1968 rev.).
Note, supra note 10 at 175-6.
Id. at 165.
32 C.R.F. § 1603.3 (1968 rev.)

24. The criteria for the standard of conduct by officers and employees of the Selective Service System can be found in 32 C.R.F. at §§ 1600.735-1 to 735-71.
25. Id. at § 1604.71.
26. Id. at § 1604.71(c).
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he feels should be reviewed; to suggest to the local board that it reopen a classification if deemed necessary by him; to attend meetings
with the local board when the board so requires; to render such assistance to the local board as it may request by advising the members
and interpreting for them laws, regulations, and other directives; and
to be equally diligent in protecting the interests of the Government and
the rights of the registrant in all matters.
The very existence of the government appeal agent and his availability to counsel registrants has been thought to mitigate the need for
the registrant to be aided by counsel. 28 However, the function of the
appeal agent has come under increasing criticism due to the inherent
conflict of interest of his work and the extent to which he actually
advises the registrants. As Senator Edward Kennedy has pointed out:
These contrary-if not totally incompatible-regulations require
a government appeal agent to protect both the interests of the
rights of an individual-a de facto case of
Government and the
29
conflict of interests.
Senator Kennedy further pointed out that as a result of a directive
dated October 26, 1967, from General Lewis B. Hershey, National
Director of the Selective Service System, appeal agents are required
to report to the local board any information which might lead to a
prosecution of any registrant under the Selective Service law.30 The
Senator commented on this directive:
Clearly, no more blatant hypocrisy and conflict of interests can
be found anywhere in our legal system. On the one hand, a
registrant is informed on his draft registration certificate that the
Government appeal agent is available at each board "who is ready
and willing to offer any legal counsel on selective service matters."
Yet, on the other hand, this same appeal agent, who is "legally
trained" wherever possible, is required to 3 divulge information
given to him in confidence by the registrant. '
The few existing empirical studies have suggested that the appeal
agent may not be playing an important part in the system. One study
27. Id. at § 1604.71(d).
28. See 113 CONG. Rc. 6778 (daily ed. May 11, 1967).
29. 114 CONG. REc. 6089 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).

30. Id.
31. Id.
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pointed out that very few draft boards bother to appoint advisors to
registrants,"2 while another found that from January to March, 1966,
eleven agents helped a total of sixteen registrants and ten of them
were helped by a single agent. Only two of the agents spent more than
one hour a month on draft work, and the most time spent in any one
3
month was four hours.
In addition to the opinion that the government appeal agent meets
the registrant's need for an attorney is the legal argument that opposes the attorney's presence because the proceedings are non-judicial
and non-criminal in nature and because recognition of the right to
counsel would be an unwarranted extension of an individual's right to
counsel.8 4 In United States v. Pitt 5 this argument was fully expressed.
The court stated that the proceedings before the local boards are informal, stripped of the panoply of formal judicial tribunals. The local
boards are composed of persons who are or should be familiar with
conditions in the county in which they serve. Frequently they know
the registrant and certainly may not be deemed to be unaware of the
problems which confront him. The registrant has the opportunity, if
he seeks it, to discuss fully with the local board his status or his claim
for exemption. The court doubted if a better or fairer method could be
devised to meet the requirement of raising armed forces in an emergency, and was of the opinion that the provisions of the Selective
Service Act afforded adequate protection for the individual registrant
and was not a violation of due process. The court further stated that
while a denial of the right to counsel in a judicial proceeding would
constitute a denial of due process, the proceedings before the Selective
Service agencies were not within that category. 6
32. Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 2123, 2147-48 (1966).

33. Note, supra note 10 at 168-69.
34. Sturgis v. United States, 342 F.2d 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
35. 144 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1944).
36. See also Nickerson v. United States, 391 F.2d 760 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 907 (1968); United States v. Capson, 347 F.2d 959 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 911 (1965); United States v. Richmond, 274 F. Supp. 43 (C.D.Cal. 1967); United
States v. Heljenek, 275 F. Supp. 579 (E.D.Pa. 1967); United States v. Kovalchick, 255 F.
Supp. 826 (ED.Pa. 1966); United States v. Schwartz, 143 F. Supp. 639 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 at 336 (1957) in which the Court opined:
The utmost devotion to one's profession and the fullest recognition of the
great role of lawyers in the evolution of a free society cannot lead one to
erect as a constitutional principle that no administrative inquiry can be had
in camera unless a lawyer be allowed to attend.
The right to representation by counsel is not an essential ingredient to a

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A second rationale opposed to the presence of an attorney at the
registrant's personal appearance is based on the emergency character
of the Selective Service function and the conviction that the nation's
welfare can neither await the customary and leisurely litigation of issues nor tolerate the law's delay. 7 This fear of a long delay in the
induction process due to the attorney's use of dilatory tactics was expressed by Senator Russell in debate on the floor of the Senate:
Under this amendment [to allow an attorney's presence at the
local board's meeting with the registrant] the registrant would
be entitled to have a lawyer at any proceeding. He would be entided to unlimited hearings on his classification. He would say,
"I am a conscientious objector." If that were overruled, he could
say, "I am studying medicine." If that were overruled, he could
say, "I am studying for the ministry," which would exempt him.
There is hardly a limit to what a resourceful lawyer . . . could
urge as a means of avoiding or delaying induction of his client.
Not only that, but when the registrant is ordered to report for
a physical examination he would be entitled.., to take his lawyer
along with him when he is physically examined, to see if any issue
could be raised and to enable him to appeal to the State board
and on up to the national board. The same thing would happen
over and over again. When he finally got his order to report for
induction he could start all over. . . . The lawyer would go
down to see if he were properly inducted. 88
Referring to the same amendment, General Hershey expressed his fear
as to the total effect upon the armed forces:
The enactment of this amendment would seriously jeopardize the
ability of the Nation to maintain adequate armed forces in my
judgment.
The nature of the function of any compulsory system to
mobilize the manpower of the Nation in time of crisis is such that
a prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders issued in that process
is indispensable to the attainment of national defense.8 9
fair hearing in all types of proceedings. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1967).

Note, "Due Process" and the Selective Service System, 30 VA. L. REv.435 (1944).
37. Note, supra note 36, at 436.
38. 114 CoNG. REc. 6083 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
39. Id. at 6077.
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Even though the courts have yet to accept such an extension of the
right to counsel and strong fears of it have been expressed by influential persons in the upper levels of our Government, the problem
is still a real one which has yet to be resolved by a decision of the
Supreme Court or by a favorable legislative enactment. The inherent
intricacy and importance of the problem was aptly stated by one

jurist:
The awesome responsibility carried by Local Boards in "balancing between the demands of an effective system of mobilizing
the nation's manpower in times of crisis and the demands of fairness toward the individual registrant," cannot justify denial of
basic fairness 40
We have, therefore, a vital function being performed by an administrative agency that has been mandated to exercise authority in
which the very life of the citizen is in the balance. Because it is an
emergency organization with emergency objectives, time is of the
essence in its operations. Since it is an organization which passes the
most vital judgments on vast numbers of citizens, one would think
that it would have incorporated within its procedural framework every
possible element and condition necessary for the protection of the individual's rights. Yet the Selective Service System remains a loose-knit,
though powerful, governmental agency that continues to place the
rights of the individual citizen in an inferior position. This stems from
the very structure of the agency itself and a fear that the exercise of
4
individual rights will cause it to lose its ability to function. '
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE SUPREME COURT

Within the past decade the Supreme Court has extended the right
to counsel beyond all past constitutional standards. The extension of
this sixth amendment 42 right began with the Court's decision in Gideon
v. Wain'wright,43 which overruled the previous constitutional standard
enunciated in Betts v. Brady.44 In Betts, the Court held that the ".
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 at 250 (7th Cir. 1967).
See Note, supra note 36.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). The Court stated that:
Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the
totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute
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appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial." 45 In overruling Betts, Gideon held that the right to counsel is
one of the fundamental rights made obligatory upon the states by the
46
fourteenth amendment. Following Gideon was Douglas v. California,
which held that an indigent has an absolute right to appointed counsel
on appeal of a state criminal conviction. In re Gault47 further held that
in a juvenile court adjudication of delinquency, the child and his
parents must be advised of their right to be represented by counsel
and, if they were unable to afford counsel, one would be appointed. In
its most recent decision on the issue, the Court broadened the concept
further in Mempa v. Rhay.48 In this opinion the right to counsel received its broadest application, as the Court ruled that counsel must
be afforded ". . . at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected." 4' The Court
said:
There was no occasion in Gideon to enumerate the various stages
in a criminal proceeding at which counsel was required, but Townsend, Moore, and Hamilton, when the Betts requirement of special
circumstances is stripped away by Gideon, clearly stand for the
proposition that appointment of counsel for an indigent is required
at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights
of a criminal accused may be affected. 0
a denial of fundamental fairness. ... may,
siderations, fall short of such denial.
45. Id. at 471.

...

in the light of other con-

46. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

47. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
48. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).

49. Id. at 257. Another area of the extension of the right to counsel yet to be
decided by the Supreme Court is that of misdemeanor cases. For views which would
deny that right, see Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1093, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965),cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966); for decisions favoring such an extension, see Minnesota
v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1967); Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D.Conn.
1966).
50. 389 U.S. 128, 130 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) held that
the absence of counsel during sentencing after a plea of guilty coupled with "assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue" deprived the defendant of due process. Mr. Justice Jackson stated in conclusion:
In this case, counsel might not have changed the sentence, but he could
have taken steps to see that the conviction and sentence were not predicated
on misinformation or misreading of court records, a requirement of fair
play which absence of counsel withheld from this prisoner. Id. at 741.
In Moore v. Michigan, 335 U.S. 155 (1957), a denial of due process was found when
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Although this trend of decisions has had a striking effect upon our
criminal law, proceedings before the local boards always have been
considered non-criminal in nature. It also has been felt that the validity
of one's classification could be raised in a criminal prosecution for a
violation of the Selective Service Act and that any injustice which
existed could be remedied. 51 This judicial remedy, however, is greatly
limited in application due to the very narrow scope of judicial review
available to one dissatisfied with his board's classification. The draft
classification process must be exhausted before judicial power can be
interposed. The exhaustion of the process ends with a registrant submitting, or refusing to submit, to induction. 2 By submitting, he may,
after induction, proceed to challenge the legality of his classification
by habeas corpus.5 By refusing, he may challenge the legality of his
classification as a defense to a criminal prosecution.M In either case, the
judicial function in reviewing the classification is closely circumscribed
to the narrow questions of whether the registrant has been denied due
process, or whether the board's classification is without basis in fact.
the defendant did not waive counsel intelligently and understandingly before entering
a plea of guilty. The Court emphasized the prejudice stemming from the absence
of counsel at the hearing on the degree of the crime following entry of the guilty plea
and stated that "the right to counsel is not a right confined to representation during
the trial on the merits." Id. at 160.
In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), it was held that failure to appoint counsel
at arraignment deprived the petitioner of due process, notwithstanding the fact that
he simply pleaded not guilty at that time, because under Alabama law, certain defenses
had to be raised then or be abandoned.
51. United States v. Capson, 347 F.2d 959 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965);
United States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 879 (1965);
Imboden v. United States, 194 F.2d 508 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952);
Peterson v. United States, 173 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949).
52. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
53. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
54. United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967). For a conscientious
objector, the scope of judicial review is even more limited since he cannot turn to the
habeas corpus remedy because his religious belief prevents him from accepting induction under any circumstances. Hence he must seek review in a criminal trial for
refusal to submit to induction. In Freeman the court stated:
In this criminal proceeding, as in any proceeding reviewing a draft classification, his defense of invalid classification is tested by the "basis in fact"
formula. Under these circumstances conviction is almost inevitable, since the
Board's refusal to grant the conscientious objector classification is based on
an inference as to the sincerity of the registrant's belief and there will almost always be something in the record to support an inference of lack of
sincerity. Id. at 249.
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In Blalock v. United States,;i the court referred to the scope of review
as the "narrowest known to the law." The court further observed:
The "clearly erroneous" rule . . . has no place here, nor even the
"substantial evidence" rule.... Congress gave the courts no general authority of revision over draft board proceedings, and we
have authority to reverse only if there is a denial of basic procedural fairness or if the conclusion of the board is without any
basis in fact.56
Due to this narrow scope of judicial review, when a registrant appears for the first time before his draft board to appeal his classification,
he may very properly be considered to be at a critical stage in a criminal proceeding against him, for at that time a decision may be made
which will be determinative in a criminal prosecution for violation of
the Selective Service Act. A criminal proceeding in the usual sense
will not be commenced until a later date when the registrant refuses
to submit to induction, or submitting to induction, chooses to sue on a
writ of habeas corpus, but the outcome of that criminal prosecution
will be a predetermined reality. As Senator Morse has pointed out:
We lawyers know that particularly in the administrative law process, once you get an administrative ruling against you, the presumption is going to follow that ruling on up the ladder. You
should guarantee or give the assurance to the individual citizen
involved that he has the right of counsel at the very beginning of
the process. I believe that is basic to guaranteeing a fair administration of justice in this country.57
And in United States v. Wierzchucki,58 where the defendant was being
tried for the failure to submit to induction, the court observed:
When criminal conviction is virtually inevitable because the die
has been cast irrevocably in the administrative proceedings,... the
right to counsel in the -criminal proceeding may be a hollow
69
thing.
55.
56.
57.
58.

247 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 619.
113 CoNG. REc. 6779 (daily ed. May 11, 1967).
248 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Wis. 1965).

59. Id. at 789.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:721

The coiit proceeded to state:
It appears that the time may have come for re-evaluation of the
constitutional implication of the closed circuit outlined above. If
it is not to be re-evaluated, then at a minimum, candor and forthrightness should accompany a basic and deliberate decision that the
expanding concept of the right to counsel in criminal cases is not
:to reach prosecutions under the Selective Service Act, and that the
reason for this restraint is that military manpower requirements
60
prevent the full sweep of individual constitutional liberties.
If a registrant is to have the effective assistance of counsel in a
criminal prosecution, that assistance must come when he first appears
before-his local board. Although such assistance is not denied when
he is charged criminally, it is at his first appearance that the determination of those criminal charges will be made. The registrant's appearance before the board is, therefore, of critical importance to him.
Unless he is allowed the right to counsel at that point, the results of
any later criminal prosecution will have been pre-determined at a
time when the balance of justice was greatly in his disfavor. Unless
the local board's determination was so erroneous as to have no "basis
in fact," the beginning and end of a criminal prosecution will have
been decided in what has been termed a "non-judicial" and "noncriminal" proceeding.
THE FEAR V. THE NEED

It would be unwarranted to grant the right of an attorney's service
to a registrant appearing before his local board without a showing that
his presence is needed. The vital importance of the personal appearance
to the registrant, the complexities of the Selective Service System's
regulations and the deprivations of due process found in the local
boards' actions establish this need. Yet the contention that an attorney's
presence may se'rerely inhibit the boards' ability to function must still
be met. Such a fear may not be as viable as anticipated and it is suggested that this fear can be assuaged by defining the scope of the attorney's activity in the presence of the local board.
60. Id. at 790. The court refused to grant the motion in defendant's favor in this
instance because it felt that there was "meager basis for decision presently provided"
to require that an Act of Congress and Presidential actioti pursuant to Congressional
authority be deemed in violation of the sixth amendment.
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Of primary importance to the registrant is the opportunity to have
his case presented effectively before the local board. Because the

registrant must rely on his own abilities in presenting his case, many
are put at a distinct disadvantage. This is more forcefully realized when
one considers that it is the young man between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-six who must appear before the board. The presence of
an attorney can aid in remedying this inherent inequity. As Senator

Morse has pointed out:
It is this place [the appearance before the local board] where he
should have the right of the oral representation of his counsel.
The local draft boards have lawyers on them .... [The presence
of an attorney] would give an equal opportunity for justice to the
registrant, to see that all his rights are presented by a lawyer
competent to present his view. Keep in mind who some of these
registrants are. Many of them do not possess much ability and
are not capable of adequately representing themselves....
Further, these very inequities may 'well play a decisive role in the
board's decision due to the basis upon which that decision is reached.
Although objective evidence is controlling, the board is constantly
attempting to weigh the credibility of the person sitting. before it.
In searching the registrant's conscience and.motives, the board may
attach a great deal of significance to his demeanor and this factor may
be decisive in a given case. 2 Therefore, an attorney's presence in aiding the registrant will enhance the chances that the board's decision
will be based on the merits of the particular situation and not on the
registrant's personal ability to sway the board.
Due to the complexities of the Selective Service Agency's Regulations, a need arises for the attorney to safeguard effectively .the rights
and privileges of the individual registrant. The statutes and amendments of the Act relate back to 1948, while the applicable regulations
are found in approximately one hundred pages of Title 32 of the Code
of Federal Regulations. Yet a great deal of pertinent information vital
to. the registrant is unknown to him. This information is contained in
the multitude of Local Board Memos sent by General Hershey or in
many of his confidential letters to the local boards. Being basically
61. 113 CONG. REc. 6779 (daily ed. "May 11, 1967).
62. See Benson & Schiesser, The Legality. of Reclassification of Selective Service

Registrants, 53 A.B.A.J. 150 (1967).
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ignorant of the law, many registrants are not aware of procedural
and substantive errors which occur in their presence. But a person
trained in the law would be able to realize when basic violations of
fairness occur. If a fair hearing is to be had, it is mandatory that each
participant be knowledgeable in the context of law within which they
are operating. It is ventured that many registrants leave the proceeding
wondering as to what exactly did transpire. 3
The only available sources of evidence of injustices stemming from
local boards' decisions are from reported personal incidents and criminal cases where either the registrant is being tried for failure to submit to induction or, being inducted, he is proceeding on a writ of
habeas corpus. While such evidence is not overly abundant, it does
indicate that an attorney's presence would have aided in assuring the
registrant fair treatment and that an "induction rate" slow-down due
to the attorney's presence is not inevitable.
Senator Hart received a letter from an attorney who had attempted
to accompany a client before the local board in his personal appearance.
He was refused admittance before the board and reported that:
At this point, my client re-appeared, his interview with the Board
was over. I estimate that the total elapsed time was four minutes
or less....

My client advised me that he had a short conversation with the
Board; that the Board refused to accept all of his documentary
material (e.g., The registrant had certain letters stating facts, and
requesting his deferment. The Board counted the number of letters.
but refused to read or receive them.) He was advised by the
decision, he
Board that if he disagreed with their forthcoming
64
could appeal to the Appeal Board within 30 days.
Senator Long of Missouri reported another incident made known to
him by an attorney who wanted to represent his eighteen year old son
before the local board. But, because the father happened to be an attorney, he was .denied the right to accompany his son. Senator Long
felt this to be an affront to the legal profession, for while any other
father could accompany his son in the personal appearance, fathers who
were also lawyers were disallowed."
63. Note, supra note 10 at 178-79.
64. 114 CONG. REc. 6075-76 (daily ed. -May 22, 1968).
65. Id. at 6074. Senator Long quoted from the attorney's letter:
Clearly a part of the lawless attitude, which is developing among our young
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In Davis v. United States66 a registrant was refused a hearing before
his local board when he was reclassified 1-A. The court held that the
refusal by the local board to consider new information offered at the
time of the registrant's appearance or its refusal to receive new information offered by the registrant was a denial of due process. The
registrant had the right to have the board consider his arguments fairly.
The failure to allow such discussion was a violation of the regulations
and, because of denial of due process, the action of the board in classifying the registrant was void6T
The local board's procedural oversight in the process of reclassifying a registrant also resulted in a void classification in Smith v. United
States.'8 There, the local board failed to add to the registrant's file a
written summary of all facts considered by it in making its classification. Upon appeal, the incomplete record was forwarded to the appeal board. The court held that an omission of material facts from
the appeal record deprived the registrant of his right to an adequate
consideration of his case on appeal and amounted to a denial of due
process by the local board, invalidating the classification and the order
for induction. In another instance, a registrant had sent a letter to the
local board after his reclassification which expressed his desire to appeal. No appeal was taken and he was ordered to be inducted. The
induction order was held void by the regulations which require that
induction should not be ordered while an appeal is pending. 9 And in
Simmons v. United States,"" it was held that the failure of the Department of Justice to furnish the registrant with a fair resume of all adverse information in the F.B.I. report regarding his status for a conscipeople, stems from their justifiable belief that they are being dealt with
unfairly by the Selective Service System. When a young man is being torn
from his home against his will for whatever reason, it is supremely important
that he be given every opportunity to feel that he has been dealt with fairly
and that he has been permitted to take advantage of his legal rights ...
If we do seek a rule of law in this country, then we must permit our
citizens effectively to exercise their legal rights.
66. 199 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1952).
67. See United States v. Zieber, 161 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1947). This right to have an
opportunity to talk over and explain one's case to the members of the local board has
been termed the "greatest value" for the registrant, "even though he has no new information to present." United States v. Stiles, 169 F.2d 455 at 458 (3d Cir. 1948).
68. 157 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1946).
69. Chih Chung Tung v. United States, 142 F.2d 919 (1st Cir. 1944); see 32 C.F.R.
1626.41 (1968 rev.).
70. 348 U.S. 397 (1955).
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entious objector exemption deprived him of the hearing provided for
in the Selective Service Act.
The preceding survey indicates that local boards have not been invariably correct in their decisions to induct registrants. When one considers that only a small percentage of the persons involved fully litigated their cases before a judicial body, the number of illegal inductions becomes proportionately larger. In each of the above situations,
had an attorney been present, he would have known the rights and
privileges of the registrant and would have guarded against their violation. However, to propose that an attorney be present to guard
against future injustices, one is still met with the contention that an
attorney's presence before the board would severely cripple its. ability
to function rapidly in the time of national crisis. Just how realistic
is this fear? It is very probable that such a fear is largely unfounded
and that ar iittorney's presence may actually streamline the board's
function.7 1 In United States v. Peterson,72 it was held that the failure
of the board to allow a registrant a personal appearance was a violation of due process and hence the board's classification of the registrant was void. If an attorney had been present, he would have known
of his client's right to an appearance. All indications are that such an
appearance would have produced a legally proper 1-A classification.
With no "basis in fact" for an appeal to the courts, the attorney would
not have had a case to present. As it happened, the court ordered the
board to grant Petersen a personal appearance. By replacing the court's
order to the local board with the attorney's knowledge of the law and
his consequent guarding of the registrant's rights, a streamlining and
hastening of the induction process would have been accomplished.
It is suggested, therefore, that the local boards also can be the recipients of the benefits of an attorney. By seeing that the registrant's
rights are not being violated an attorney can aid the local board in not
71. It has been suggested that a clear presentation of all relevant facts before the
local board might result in even fewer appeals, thus relieving part of the burden of
the time-consuming appeal procedure. Note, Fairness and Due Process Under the
Selective Service System, 14 U. PA. L. REV. 1014, 1033 (1966).
72. 53 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1944). For other instances where a local board's
decision has been declared void by the courts, see United States ex. rel. Berman v.
Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Fry, 203 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1953);
Knox v. United States, 200 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1952); Davis v. United States, 199 F.2d
689 (6th Cir. 1952); In re Abramson, 196 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1952); United States v.
Stiles, 169 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Zieber, 161 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1947);
United States ex. rel. Remke v. Read, 123 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
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committing obvious breaches of due process. The attorney's knowledge
of the present law can enhance the board's ability to deal fairly with
the registrant. By guarding his client's rights, the attorney will be of
service to both his client and the local board. 73
Although the registrant is in need of the assistance of counsel, no one
could argue rationally that an attorney should be able to halt the boards'
vital function. But are the registrant's need and the local board's function mutually exclusive alternatives? Cannot individual rights be protected within an administrative agency without that agency's complete breakdown? Could not the agency establish guidelines for the
attorney whereby he would be allowed a "limited presence" to advise, consult and, if need be, represent his client and not be allowed
the chance to slow drastically the local board's function? Could not an
attorney's presence be allowed for the purpose of an expert's firsthand surveillance of the board's procedure and activity so that he
may be fully able to represent and protect his client's rights should he
later find himself in a court of law defending in a criminal prosecution?74 Since the local boards keep no record of their proceedings,
when a registrant finds himself defending in a court of law, his attorney
must rely on second-hand information and evidence related to him by

his client. 75 Should an attorney's presence be allowed the registrant
can be assured that something other than his own memory will be
73. The majority of local boards may very well need such assistance. As one writer
suggests:
Since [the local board members] are unpaid volunteers with other full-time
employment, and are not offered brush-up courses on the law, they may
not have studied the new statutes passed July 1, 1967, or the regulations
issued under it. They may not have studied the over 100 Local Board
Memos issued by General Hershey or his confidential letters to the
local boards. It is extremely doubtful that they have all read the recent
United States Supreme Court or courts of appeals decisions on draft cases.
There are no standards for competence and no education or experience
qualifications for draft board members.
Ginger, Mininum Due Process Standards In Selective Service Cases-Part 1, 19
HAsnTNGs L.J. 1313 at 1323 (1968).
74. As one observer noted:
There is no procedure by which citizens can obserie or scrutinize the decision making process of local boards and there is no annual evaluation of
the procedures followed or the correctness of local boards' decisions by the
State Director, Gen. Hershey or an independent agency. Id. at 1324.
75. A board is entitled to survey its registrants in light of ivorld conditions and
in so doing it need not keep elaborate records of matters discussed or its
considerations in making or changing a classification, nor record its thoughts
and motives. BENsoN & ScHmssmi, supra note 62 at 151.
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able to capture all pertinent information which may be vital to him
in the future. 70 As one observer stated:
If an attorney were permitted to attend the personal appearance,
he could be expected to familiarize himself with the statutes or
regulations in advance and then observe whether the board's actions
conformed with legal requirements. It is no solution to say that
the registrant can report his experiences to his attorney. The
registrant may not appreciate the legal significance of certain board
actions, and his account of the personal appearance may omit
crucial details ....

Further, the presence of someone other than

the registrant and board members at the personal appearance could
7
serve as a check on abusive behavior by board members."
CONCLUSION

The Selective Service System plays an extremely important role
in the lives of millions of young men. No other federal agency holds
such powerful sway over the destiny of so many. Yet with such extensive governmental power it has failed to allow young men who
must confront it the basic safeguard of having their rights protected
by someone knowledgeable in the law. Instead of having his fate decided in a proceeding which allows the registrant to be on equal terms
with those who will make the decision, the Selective Service System
"places him behind closed doors to fend for himself in a contest
that
matches his knowledge of the law with those who sit to decide what
that law will be. A mismatch of intelligence, knowledge, and competence is the obvious result. If the System is to retain public approval
and if the rule of law is to prevail in our society, a fairer system must
be devised to perform the System's vital function. If it is the structure
of the System itself which is the cause for a denial of individual rights,
then the answer plainly must lie in its reformation and not in the continued deprivation of those individual rights. No matter what the
necessity of an institution's function, if it is not able to operate within
the laws, its operation cannot be justified. And if that function is vital
to a free society, then a system should be devised which is worthy of
operation in such a society.
ANTHONY GAETA, JR.
76. Although the local board's hearing is not criminal, it is here that the administrative record is made, and, should the registrant later wish to contest
his classification in court, he will be doing so in a criminal proceeding.
Note, supra note 71 at 1032.
77. Comment, supra note 32 at 2150-1.

